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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the industrialized world, domestic policies concerning 
the communications sector are changing rapidly. Yet the methods and 
directions of change have been quite diverse. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine how the institutional history of communications in 
each country, together with the country's political structure, is 
likely to affect the direction, speed and permanency of reform. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
Roger G. Noll 
All nations, regardless of how their political and economic 
systems are organized, exercise considerable political control over the 
communications sector. In all but a few countries, ministries or 
government enterprises provide broadcast and telecoDDDunications 
services, and even in countries that rely upon the private sector to 
supply such services, government bureaus exercise considerably control 
over the industry. 
For technical and economic reasons discussed in this book, 
coDDDunications policy is undergoing transition and reevaluation in most 
developed countries. Whether deregulation, privatization, or 
decentralization, change is everywhere apparent. Yet each country has 
relatively little experience with alternative institutional 
arrangements of the coDDDunications sector. One potentially valuable 
use of international comparative studies is to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the performance of 
policy alternatives and the institutional and political environment in 
which they must be embedded. This can provide some basis for 
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constructing reasonable, informed expectations about the likely 
consequences of changes in domestic policies in the absence of any 
domestic experience or evidence that is directly pertinent. 
With opportunity, however, comes danger, for international 
comparative studies inspect institutions and performance in diverse 
political settings. To the extent that the performance of the 
communications sector depends in subtle ways upon the interactions 
between political institutions and market organization, these factors 
must be taken into account in comparative analysis. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general conceptual 
framework for examining the role of political and institutional 
structure in shaping the performance of the communications sector. The 
ult imate objective is to contribute to enhancing our understanding of 
the factors that affect the growth and direction of levers available to 
public decision-makers. The more proximate objective is to provide a 
framework for organizing data collection and analysis that will enable 
us to ask and answer the right questions about how institutions-­
polit ical and economic--affect the performance of the industry: the 
efficiency of the price signals it sends to its customers; the extent 
to which its services match the economic and other demands of the 
society ; the efficiency of its technology and the rate at which it 
innovates; and the distributional gainers and losers from its 
operations and practices. 
Successful international comparisons for the purposes of examining 
the relat ionships between inst itutions and performance depend on 
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solving a number of difficult data problems. Most obvious are those 
related to basic economic and technical variables. Prices, costs and 
quantities of service must be measured consistently through time and 
between countries. In addition, data must be collected in a way that 
enables some measurement of the extent to which accounting practices 
within each country not only affect data comparability, but create 
incentives affecting the truthful revelation of accurate information-­
and even the technical choices among methods of delivering services 
(and, therefore, indirectly the costs of providing service). These 
problems, discussed more completely in this volume by Bridger Mitchell, 
illustrate one important way--but not the way examined in this 
chapter--that institutional arrangements and practices affect 
performance. 
The remainder of this chapter examines other connections between 
institutional arrangements and performance. The principal working 
hypothesis is that the performance of the communications sector-­
indeed, of any part of the economy--depends upon the political and 
economic environment in which it operates , Here the political and 
economic environment is taken to mean the type of organizations that 
make decisions affecting prices, technology, service, and other 
important variables; the relationships among these organizations; the 
rules governing these relationships; and the nature of the process for 
changing these rules. To understand the process driving the 
performance of the sector requires an accurate characterization of this 
environment and a theory for relating these characteristics to 
4 
performance. I will divide this task into two components, each of 
which will be assigned a section in this chapter. Section 2 deals with 
the supply environment: the range of alternative ways to organize the 
sector that provides communications services. Section 3 deals with the 
political environment: now the political system affects the policy 
choices of political officials and the objectives they seek. This 
section also discusses interactions between the two: how the supply 
and political environments interact with one another to shape the 
performance of the industry. 
2. CHARACTERIZING THE SUPPLY STRUCTURE
Numerous economic variables are likely to be associated with the 
performance of the communications sector, regardless of its 
institutional structure. These obviously must be taken into account in 
any assessment of the sector's performance. Among these are 
macroeconomic conditions, the country's trade policies, and the state 
of the country's technical know-how. But the importance of 
communications arises in part because these variables are also affected 
by the performance of the sector, which in turn is affected by the 
sector's structural characteristics. The two most important structural 
characteristics are the organizational forms of the participants, and 
the number and ease of entry of suppliers. 
The range of structural possibilities can be relatively easily 
comprehended by depicting it in a two-dimensional diagram (Figure 1). 
The vertical axis represents ease of entry as an institutional (rather 
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than technical) variable. That is, it measures the extent to which 
government policy is favorable to entry. The origin represents a 
government policy that prohibits entry. The upper bound of the 
vertical axis represents an absence of policies that inhibit entry, 
combined with policies, like antitrust, that attempt to prevent entry­
foreclosing strategies of incumbents (except through superior 
efficiency). 
The horizontal axis arrays the various institutional forms and 
market structures that might develop. In reality, this dimension 
collapses two quite distinct concepts into one measure. The first is 
the traditional market structure variable: how many entities operate 
in the market. The second is the degree of reliance on the private 
sector versus direct government control. These two concepts are 
amenable to combination because of their high degree of correlation. 
Specifically, one rarely finds government ownership combined with a 
multiorganizational structure, nor separate regulatory institutions for 
overseeing either ministries or competitive private industry. 
Nevertheless, there are exceptions: Australia's competing airlines 
(one private, one public); the Postal Rate Commission, which regulates 
the United States Postal Service, a government corporation that is a 
monopolist in many services, but faces unregulated competitors in 
express service and small package delivery; and economic regulation of 
trucking in several countries. Here the exposition in two dimensions 
is for ease of representation and the approximate accuracy it brings to 
the organizational choices that have emerged in the communications 
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sector. On the horizontal axis, by combining the degree of 
concentration of the supply of service and the extent of direct 
government, we are measuring the degree of government involvement in the 
management of firms in the industry. 
The principal use of the diagram is as a device for analyzing 
alternative forms of industry organization in terms of the extent to 
which they are subject to effective political control. The origin 
represents the minimum in structure and the maximum of political 
control: the ministerial department that provides a monopoly service 
from which potential competitors are banned. Next along the horizontal 
axis come other monopolistic forms that have less direct political 
control: the independent government corporation, l ike the BBC before 
entry was permitted by private competitors, and the private regulated 
monopoly, such as AT&T in the United States before the precompetitive 
regulatory and court decisions of the 1970s. 
To explicate the meaning of the diagram, several well-known 
organizations in the communications sectors have been located on it. 
In each case, these organizations have been located twice--in an 
"early" and "late" incarnation, where the intervening period covers the 
changes between, say, the 1950s and the 1980s. Undertaking this 
exercise, of course, emphasizes the extent of the transition that the 
communications sector is now experiencing. The general tende-ncy is a 
movement away from the origin in both dimensions--toward more 
competition. 
As entry becomes easier, and the number of firms increases, two 
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phenomena occur. F irst, the number and d iversity of competitors make 
the industry more difficult to control politically because of the sheer 
magnitude of the attendant informational and enforcement problems. 
Second, the competitive interactions among firms give the political 
actors less opportunity to alter their performance in directed, 
politically useful ways. A competitive environment creates less slack 
(monopoly prof its or inefficiencies of operation) that can be 
redistributed politically. The least potential for political control 
resides in the upper right-hand portion of the figure, where numerous 
organizations supply service and entry is easy. 
The theoretical significance of these two dimensions is 
sufficiently straightforward to be quickly summarized. Economic theory 
postulates that private firms seek to max imize profits; bureaucratic 
theory posits the maximization of bureau size and authority (Downs, 
1967; Niskanen, 1971; Wildovsky, 1964). The profit motive is derived 
from the objectives of private sources of capital to the firm, which 
are transmitted through the incentive structure of the firm: profit­
seeking behavior by employees at all levels is rewarded. The desire to 
increase bureau s ize and authority is derived from the incentives of 
bureau managers, whose power and rewards are positively related to the 
importance of the bureau. For private firms and for bureaus facing an 
elastic demand curve, these motives produce technical efficiency--the 
organization will minimize costs for whatever level of service it 
provides (Baumol, 1967). For bureaus facing inelastic demand, bureau 
size (measured by inputs) is maximized by adopting cost-enhancing 
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technologies--means of providing service that require more inputs. 
Finally, as discussed by Mitchell elsewhere in this book, the behavior 
of a bureau, although with some s ignificant and subtle differences that 
depend on the method chosen for calculating allowed profits and for 
setting prices. 
In all instances, supply organizations are likely to possess 
information about technology, costs, and demand superior to that 
commanded by political actors seeking to control the suppliers. The 
extent of this informational superiority will depend in part on the 
degree of separation of the supply organization from the means of 
political control, and in part on the resources government officials 
allocate to monitoring performance of supply organization (Noll, 1983). 
The gap is smallest for ministerial agencies, and greatest when a 
regulatory bureau must cope with a heterogeneous group of competitive, 
private suppliers. Hence, the poss ibility for strategic use of 
information to serve organizational objectives depends on the structure 
of the supply side of the industry (Noll and Gwen, 1983). Somewhere 
along the middle of the horizontal axis lies the point at which 
strategic possibilit ies are maximal: the structure is not sufficiently 
competitive for interactions among supply organizations to force 
eff icient operations by eliminating excess profits and inefficient 
technical choice, but the informational superiority of the suppliers 
gives them significant autonomy from political control. Entry policy 
also affects manipulability: easy entry serves as a threat against 
ineff icient operations, whereas precluded entry provides suppliers with 
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more possibilities for benefiting from information manipulation. 
The preceding summary of the theoretical arguments relating 
structure to performance are focused on so-called static efficiency: 
given current technical knowledge, how efficiently does an industry 
operate? Of at least equal significance in the long run is dynamic 
efficiency: how does the industry perform in developing new 
technologies that lower costs and/or expand the number of services that 
produce net societal benefits? 
Theory is less well developed about dynamic efficiency, but some 
propositions have emerged (Klein, 1977; Mansfield, 1977; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Reinganum, 1984). First, the most innovative industries 
appear to be those with a few highly rivalrous firms in which entry is 
also relatively easy. Second, large, established firms normally 
account for relatively steady incremental change, while entrants 
normally account for radical departures from established technology. 
Third, in the most progressive industries the rank order of firms by 
sales, profits and other measures of success tends to be unstable, as 
do measures of market concentration. Apparently the possibility of 
experiencing meteoric rises and falls in fortune provides the incentive 
to maintain a large R&D effort and a willingness to innovate and take 
risks. Thus, relatively free entry, in the absence of controls on 
market shares, and some degree of significant competition all appear to 
be important factors affecting technical progress. Nevertheless, there 
are important exceptions, so that such generalizations must be hedged. 
In the United States, for example, telecommunications was monopolized 
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from approximately World War I until the early 1970s; technical 
progress, however, was quite rapid. On the other hand, the period of 
concentration (recent years and the period before World War I) also 
experienced high rates of progress (Brock, 1981). Whether progress was 
more or less rapid during the period of monopoly is an issue on which 
there is relatively little information, and which is not likely ever to 
be convincingly resolved. Technical progress also appears to have been 
quite rapid in Japan, which has had monopolized service but rivalrous 
equipment manufacturing with some political entry barriers, the latter 
due to the practices of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, but with a general movement in the direction of more 
competition. The general guideline relating structural aspects of the 
supply side to performance appear to be as follows. Whereas monopoly 
and foreclosed entry hold the possibility of capturing economies of 
scale and scope and of exercising closer political control, they 
increase the opportunities for monopolistic inefficiencies and 
probably, on balance, mitigate against dynamic efficiency. Rivalry 
among large firms with easy entry probably enhances short-run and long­
run efficiency, but attenuates political control. 
3. CHARACTERIZING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
The preceding analysis discussed the relationship between the 
supply structure and the feasibility of political control, but without 
mentioning what political control might be used to achieve. Obviously, 
political actions can serve numerous goals relating to economic 
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efficiency, equity, social cohesion, and technical progress, not to 
mention narrower, self-interested political objectives of politicians. 
The purpose of this section is to outline the various political 
objectives that might develop, and how they are likely to be related to 
the political structure of a country--that is, how a country's 
political institutions may shape its political objectives in 
communications policy. 
In comparison to the microeconomic issues raised in the preceding 
section, theory is less settled on the question of political behavior. 
Several approaches are currently in use, and their relative popularity 
among research scholars varies considerably among countries. 
Consequently, the presentation here will be eclectic, attempting to 
summarize the principal arguments of each school of thought. I choose 
this tactic for two reasons. First, reflecting the state of 
development of the field, no approach is clearly superior for 
explaining all facets of political choice, and each can legitimately 
claim to shed light on some aspect of political behavior. Although I 
have my preferences regarding where new insights are most likely to be 
found, there are at present more intuitive than scientific. Second, 
regardless of the intrinsic scientific merit of alternative approaches, 
each has faithful adherents who are not likely to be reached by 
analysis that does not connect to their favored theoretical construct. 
Consequently, as a framework for inducing more research into 
international comparative studies of communications policy, this book 
would unnecessarily limit its potential audience and impact by being 
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too doctrinaire in the choice of a theoretical f ramework. 
For ease of exposition, political theories are herein divided into 
f our distinct categories. Each is rather broad, encompassing a number 
of approaches that probably are not comfortable being classified 
together. These are: Atomistic Democratic Theory; Statist Theory; 
Pluralist Theory; and Institutional Theory. 
3. 1 Atomistic Democratic Theory 
This class of models of political behavior abstracts from the 
effects of political institutions and, in many cases, f rom the presence 
of serious conflicts of interest. In some cases, it presumes the 
existence of something called "the public interest," which is the 
policy that, in a world of complete information and ef ficient 
institutions, would be adopted by consensus. In other cases, 
democratic theory focuses on the positive theory of democratic 
processes in which there is a stable majority-rule winner (Downs, 1957; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) . These theories are also individualistic, 
in that normative judgments are based upon consequences in terms of the 
welfare of the members of the polity. In welfare economics, for 
example the public interest is derived from a "social welfare function" 
that is a weighted sum of functions relating individual welfare to 
consumption and wealth (Bergson, 1966) . 
Two concepts command most of the attention of this approach. The 
first is economic efficiency: producing at minimum cost, optimizing 
the rate of technical change, and providing exactly the right amount of 
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every counnodity and service f or which the net consumer benefits from 
use exceed the net social costs of production. Normatively, ef ficiency 
is interesting because of its consistency with the utilitarian 
objective of the greatest good f or the greatest number (e. g. maximizing 
economic welfare). As a positive theory of political behavior, the 
argument rests on its internal logic--a move to enhance ef ficiency is 
Pareto improving, at least in principle, in that the extra goods from 
improved ef ficiency can be divided among all citizens to make everyone 
better off. 
The second dominant concept is distributional equity. 
Normatively, distributional equity rests on egalitarian or utilitarian 
foundations; if the latter, it is derived from the plausibility of the 
assumption that people are roughly equal in their ability to enjoy 
economic well-being. Positively, both political philosophy and 
institutionless, one-dimensional (economic welfare) formal positive 
political theory support the conclusion of egalitarian tendencies. 
Rawls (1971) , f or example, argues for the collective rationality of 
distributional equity as the social norm if distributional questions 
were decided by citizens before they knew their identities (abilities, 
inherited status, tastes, etc. ). 
The economist's normative theory of the democratic state 
presupposes the separability of the two issues. For example, Samuelson 
(1954) proposed separating public debate into two issues: the ideal 
distribution of income, and then, once that is settled, the efficient 
operation of the economy, both public and private. Unfortunately, of 
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course, these goals are not separable to the extent that not all 
distributions of income are consistent with all possible combinations 
of efficient production of goods and services. Put another way, 
redistributing income to the desirable extent cannot be achieved 
without cost, including costs owing to distortions of the incentive 
structure conveyed through markets. Moreover, to the extent there is 
disagreement about distributional goals, one must either allow people 
to attempt to achieve distributional objectives at each significant 
decision point about allocation, or make the political decision process 
authoritarian in that some allocative choices are not susceptible to 
normal democratic influences. In any case, when choices must be made 
over a set of issues that span more than one dimension (e. g. 
distribution equity and the quantity of a public good to be provided), 
majority-rule democracy does not, in general, produce an equilibrium, 
or even a normatively interesting outcome (Arrow, 1951; McKelvey, 
1979). 
The usefulness of atomistic democratic theory is not so much that 
it is an accurate theory of the behavior of political actors, but that 
it focuses attention on certain summary questions of economic impact. 
Efficiency and equity (or dist ributional effects) matter, even if they 
are not determinative of the policy choice in a concise, utilitarian 
way. Moreover, much of the public debate--especially as enunciated by 
civil servants and other analysts--is cast in these terms. Not only 
economists, but lawyers, engineers, and other professional groups have 
relatively well developed concepts of efficiency and equity within 
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their frameworks of analysis. Presumably such "objectivist" input to 
the political process has value, or else political actors would not 
actively seek it. 
Applied to communications policy, this world view is relatively 
straightforward. It tends to raise economic efficiency to the level of 
a social imperative. Judgments among alternative arrangements are made 
according to their relative efficiency, perhaps with, but more likely 
without, attention to distributional considerations, although as 
Feldstein (1972) and Willig and Bailey (1981) show, this latter 
characteristic is inessential to the basic idea. Moreover, there is 
often the implicit (rarely explicit) assumption that political 
processes will produce efficiency if only technical analysts do a good 
job presenting the facts. This was recently argued, with some caveats, 
in Breyer's (1981) analysis of regulatory reform in the United States. 
The indeterminacy of majority rule undermines democratic theory as 
a good device for predicting policy; however, it also introduces the 
opportunity to include the role of political leadership into the 
example of the debates over slavery and states' rights in the United 
States in the first half of the nineteenth century, shows how political 
entrepreneurs made systematic use of the instability of the status quo 
to enhance their power--and change policy. Although telecommunications 
issues are not likely to achieve sufficient salience to become the 
focus of a great national debate, they can be swept along by larger, 
destabilizing movements like deregulation in the U. S. or 
decentralization in France, which may be predictable and may (or may 
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not) lead to performance-enhancing changes in policy. 
3.2 Statist Theory 
The statist view of national policy-making focuses on the state as 
a decision-making entity that is separable analytically from its 
constituent parts. States have sovereignty over geographic areas, 
organizations and people, and they have objectives that they pursue 
through combinations of coercion and inducement. 
Statist theory is a heterogeneous category of methods of analyzing 
national policies, sufficiently so that for many purposes the category 
would be too broad to be useful. Much of this category is essentially 
political philosophy, asking what a state ought to do, how it ought to 
do it, and under what conditions it ought to command the loyalty of its 
citizens; and examining the constitutional and other legal rules of the 
society to ascertain whether they conform to these normative criteria 
(see Eckstein, 1979). Other statist approaches view the state as 
allocating power within the society for the purpose of serving the 
interests of a particular class or group, as for example Marxist or 
elitist theories (e.g. Duvall and Freeman, 1983; Lukes, 1974; for more 
curmudgeonly comparisons of these forms of statist theories with 
pluralism, to be discussed below, see Manley, 1983, and Polsby, 1980). 
A similar approach posits that the state is analogous to a business in 
that it seeks to maximize the wealth and power of state officials 
(North, 1981). But the most common approach is to assume that the 
state pursues the "national interest. " Among economists, especially of 
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the Chicago tradition, national interest is usually equated to present 
and future national income, and the conclusion is to foster internal 
and external economic liberalism (e.g. Friedman, 1981; Johnson, 1967). 
Political scientists, however, adopt a broader definition of national 
interest, incorporating internal and external stability (Howard, 1979) 
and the positive assertion of national power in the international 
community (Aron, 1966; Morgenthau, 1948). Indeed, the preeminence of 
the nation-state as the dominant organizational unit in human society 
is attributed to its superiority in these largely noneconomic domains 
(Tilly, 1975). The most significant implication of this work is that 
the design of optimal policy requires that tradeoffs be made between 
purely economic values (both national wealth and distributional equity) 
and the objectives related to power, security and stability (Krasner, 
1976; Katzenstein, 1977; Gilpin, 1981). One source of tradeoff is, of 
course, the direction requirements of the noneconomic objectives, but 
another is that the state, in order to retain its power and 
sovereignty, must cut deals with potentially threatening groups of 
constituents that, in the short run, detract from economic objectives 
and, perhaps, even objectives relating to international power, but that 
are essential to retaining internal stability (e. g. Mahon and Mytelka, 
1983; Martin, 1979). 
The most important unsolved puzzle in all statist theories is the 
magnitude of the relative weights assigned to various national 
objectives, and the process by which they are derived. Only Marxists 
have an explanation for this, which is the linkage between ownership of 
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the physical resources used in production and the distribution of 
political power. A critique of this view is not within the scope of 
this paper; suffice it to say that most scholars find it at best 
incomplete. In any case, the absence of an endogenous process for 
establishing national objectives makes empirical research primarily an 
ex post search for explanations of policy changes, running the risk of 
spurious correlation and tautological argument. Another difficulty is 
the absence of much concrete analysis about the connections between 
state actions and internal stability: e. g. how, specifically, does a 
particular domestic policy affect the legitimacy of the state's claim 
to loyalty from the citizenry? 
Because of the incomplete state of development of statist theory, 
it is hazardous to use it to predict a policy environment for any 
sector on the basis of expected economic, technological and political 
changes. But this may be due to the nascent stage of development of 
the theory when applied to domestic economic policies, rather than 
necessarily the absence of intrinsic merit in the approach. In any 
case, the form of the analysis would be as follows. 
To explain developments in an area of microeconomic policy, such 
as communications, statist theory indicates that the relevant facts are 
the linkages between the sector and policy, on the one hand, and the 
purpose of the state on the other. Policy will favor the enhancement 
of groups and sectors that are viewed as essential to the maintenance 
of state power, internal stability, and the structure that supports it, 
as well as of national wealth. An industry that could become an 
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important source of political instability will be protected if it is 
inefficient in world markets, and in any case it will not be seriously 
tinkered with unless it is threatened with decline. An industry that 
is seen as potentially threatening to the established state structure 
will be constrained or even prohibited, regardless of the economic 
growth potential it provides. 
Telecommunications and broadcasting are important to the state 
because of the role of communications in maintaining social cohesion 
and the importance of communications systems and technologies to 
national security and the rest of the economic system. Hence, statists 
view as natural a persistent government policy to promote the sector, 
including its protection against domination by foreigners or 
potentially disruptive internal groups. The purpose of government 
policy will be threefold: to assure that the sector does not become a 
barrier to the development of other favored economic activities; to 
promote developments that support the state's overall economic and 
political objectives; and to make sure that the use of the 
communications network is consistent with the goal of promoting state 
social and cultural interests. 
Superficially, privatization and deregulation appear inconsistent 
with statist doctrine; however, this is not necessarily the case. Both 
are consistent with state interests if the state is certain that forces 
supportive of the state will control them. A trend toward these 
policies, then, would be viewed as caused by increasing confidence by 
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the state in the supportiveness of the groups that would control the 
sector. 
3. 3 Pluralist Theory 
The pluralists might otherwise be regarded as a type of atomistic 
democratic theorists. Their focus is on the aggregation of individuals 
by economic interests, with explicit recognition that interests are in 
conflict and that different interests may be represented in the 
political system with differing degrees of effectiveness. As used 
here, the term refers to political theories that are individualistic 
(although they may never disaggregate the population further than by 
economic interest groups), that focus on the resolution of conflicts of 
interest, but that are stripped of significant attention to the role of 
most political institutions--as also are the two preceding theoretical 
schools. 
Pluralists are also a heterogeneous lot, so this category should 
be viewed as quite loose. Some pluralists are antireductionist 
sociologists who would reject my calling this school individualistic, 
for they regard the disaggregation of interest groups into 
individual members as necessarily entailing a significant loss in the 
potential explanatory power of group behavior. Nevertheless, they 
would agree that the group acts to achieve self-interested ends for its 
members, and in this sense the theory is individualistic. Other 
pluralists are economists who build theories of group behavior by using 
game theory to analyze the interactions of members of the group (Olson, 
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1965). Some pluralists also believe that the policy emanating from 
interest-group interactions has important normative signif icance--a 
political legitimacy arising form the legitimacy of the process that 
produced it; such as a democratic political process (Bentley, 1908). 
Others take a less sanguine view, analyzing perversities of the 
solutions to interest-group games. These include Dahl (1982) and 
Lindblom (1977), who are explicitly pluralist; and Becker (1983), 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), who exemplify the closely analogous 
Chicago school of public policy-making. 
The basic structure of pluralist theories is largely the same for 
all, and easily characterized. Each group in the political process can 
be viewed as receiving some payoff from every contemplated movement of 
public policy, and in particular of having a most desired direction for 
policy to move--the direction with the highest payoff to the group. In 
addition, each group has a cost of effective representation of its 
cause in the political process. These costs depend on the difficulty 
of organizing the group, getting its members to support group 
activities, and reaching a group consensus on how the group activities, 
and reaching a group consensus on how the group should act. Holding 
the total stakes of each group member constant, these costs should 
increase with the size and heterogeneity of interest of the group, 
because smaller groups face less difficulty in preventing some members 
from free riding on others and in reaching agreement on the group's 
methods and objectives. The amount of political force a group can 
bring to bear on policy is then the difference between its stakes and 
22 
its costs of maintaining cohesion. The policy outcome is the policy 
position where the forces being applied by all groups in different 
directions are mutually cancelling. Hence, to measure the likely 
policy outcome, pluralist theory instructs us to measure the stakes, 
organization, membership and effectiveness of the interests 
participating in the debate. And in particular, one group that can 
normally be ignored is the general public in the role of final 
consumer. The wealth and income side of each person's interests is 
more effectively organized than the expenditure side because of the 
diffuse, heterogeneous nature of the latter. 
In terms of industrial policies, the pluralist school leads to the 
view that policy will work to preserve the existing sources and 
distribution of income, and to enhance the position of the groups 
already advantaged. This means relative passivity to expanding 
sectors, but protectionist interventions for contracting ones, 
especially if the latter are unionized and highly concentrated so that 
a few powerful, well-organized groups are exerting force on the 
political system. Applied to the communications sector, the outcome is 
not theoretically predetermined, for the sector has conflicting 
characteristics. It is rapidly expanding, so the welfare of existing 
interests is not usually threatened; however, it is also highly 
concentrated, and thus present workers and owners, especially if 
organized effectively, have a strong incentive to lobby for 
prohibitions against entry that will enable them to extract additional 
gains from expansion. The outcome, according to the pluralist view, 
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should depend on the extent to which the sources of growing demand are 
organized to offset the demands of the industry for entry controls. 
Another group that pluralists predict will have limited influence 
is foreign producers, because of their truncated opportunities for 
political participation. Free trade in an industry comes about only 
under two conditions: either the industry is too poorly organized (or 
so advanced technically) that the net gains of working for protection 
(e. g. the difference between reduced sales by foreigners and the costs 
of obtaining political intervention) are not positive; or other, better 
organized industries with extensive foreign markets fear retaliation if 
the first industry is protected, and work to offset the political 
activities in support of protection. This would require some natural 
political or technical linkage between the two industries. 
In the case of communications, the likely result is protection, 
especially if the most important linkage industries (computers, 
electronics) are weak, seek protection, and so do not have a big stake 
in foreign sales. Only a very inefficient communications sector, 
combined with a well organized, long-suffering user group, could be 
expected to offset this coalition. 
3.4 Institutional Theory 
The new institutionalists take the position that the details of 
the political system--its rules and organization--matter in terms of 
the development of public policy. Like pluralists, institutionalist 
theories tend to be individualistic, seeing policy as the result of 
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individual actiods and as evaluated by individual effects. They also 
incorporate interest-group behavior into their models, and sometimes 
other, more general democratic forces (such as those outlined in 
atomistic democratic theories). But the key point is that the 
incentives and actions of groups and individuals are filtered through 
an explicit analysis of the effects of institutions. the defining idea 
of the school is that policy is the result of the incentives operating 
on political officials, and that these incentives are the result of 
interactions between the political activities of constituents and the 
political institutions through which these activities must be 
channeled. 
One focus of institutional analysis is the importance of the 
electoral system: the "electoral connection" between citizens and 
policy makers (Fiorina, 1977; Fiorina and Noll, 1979). The object of 
this analysis is to examine how the method of electing the government 
affects the way politicians make policy. 
For simplicity, consider two questions concerning how the 
government is elected. One is the autonomy of the legislative and 
executive politicians. At one extreme, parliamentary systems do not 
have autonomous, independent legislative and executive branches; the 
parliament serves both functions, so that the individual members cannot 
disassociate themselves from party and policy, whether of the 
government or of the opposition. At the other extreme is the United 
States government, with its separation of the legislative and executive 
branch (with separate elections) and further separation of the 
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legislative branch into two coequal houses. Here a legislator is 
independent of the executive, and, as one decision-maker amongst many 
independent agents, can hardly be held accountable for the general 
state of policy emanating from government. 
The second dimension of governmental structure is the nature of 
the constituencies from which legislators are elected. The extreme 
cases here are nationwide proportional representation and single-member 
geographic districts. In the former voters cast ballots for parties, 
and parties run ordered lists of candidates for the legislature. The 
share of the party's representation is determined by its share of the 
total vote, and candidates on the party list are declared elected down 
to the point at which the party's legislative seats are exhausted. In 
the latter, each party nominates a candidate to fill a legislative seat 
representing a specific constituency. The ultimate winner can be 
either the candidate with a plurality of the vote in the first 
election, or the eventual majority winner after a sequence of runoffs. 
Both of these structural characteristics are illustrated in Figure 
2, in which several legislative bodies are located for expositional 
purposes. The degree of legislative autonomy is the most difficult 
concept to grasp, and then to measure, for it depends on the rules 
governing the relationship between the branches of government. In 
France, for example, the branches are separate, but the legislature is 
relatively weak because the executive can dictate the legislative 
agenda. In most nations that practice separation of powers, the 
legislature controls its own agenda. Proposals from the executive 
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branch have no standing unless introduced by a legislator, and even 
then have no precedence over other proposals that have been introduced. 
The significance of these factors is in the incentives and 
political behavior that they induce upon voters and legislators. 
Generally, as a nation moves upwards and to the right from the origin 
in Figure 2, the legislature is more likely to respond to pluralist 
demand for special-interest legislation. Under nationwide proportional 
representation, legislators do not receive personal votes, and hence 
their ability to build an independent base of support--separate from 
the party--is vastly limited. Only at the level of the national party 
will interest groups gain recognition. And because specific industries 
or narrow economic interests are likely to be too small to provide a 
large enough electoral base to support a party, particularism is 
manifested through parties that represent either much larger affinity 
groups--labor, religious groups, ethnic groups, ideological groups--or 
broad coalitions of economic interest (Barry, 1975). By contrast, the 
smallest support constituency for a legislator occurs in single-member 
districts in which elections are decided by plurality. Here a 
legislator represents a tiny fraction of the total population, and need 
not win even half of the vote to be elected. At this level, narrow 
economic interests are far more likely to be the deciding force in 
legislative elections, as analyzed in Cox, McCubbins and Sullivan 
(1983). 
The significance of the autonomy dimension is in the ability of 
the legislature to carry out the preferred policies of its members 
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against the wishes of the executive. In parliamentary systems, the 
conflict between the legislative and executive branches is minimized 
because the latter are chosen by the former, and in any case individual 
members have little opportunity to act autonomously. But an autonomous 
legislature representing narrow constituencies has the power and 
inclination to engage in distributional politics in the most 
particularistic form--as, for example, the fames "pork barrel" in the 
American legislature (Ferejohn, 1974; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson, 
1981). Even in Great Britain, the structure of constituencies, despite 
the relative weakness of individual members, creates some opportunities 
for a legislator to develop an independent base of strength from the 
party through the British counterpart to pork barrel, called "dust bin" 
politics, as documented by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1983). 
In the pure pluralist model, the political equilibrium is for a 
degree of politics that actually reduces national income and wealth. 
The reason is that each group sees only its share of taxation as the 
cost of its favored program, but captures the full benefit. 
Interaction among interest groups seeking special favors, when modeled 
as a noncooperative game, leads to a prisoner's dilenuna situation--an 
outcome in which all would be better off if no group received favors, 
but each group is better off joining the winning distributive coalition 
than attempting to undermine it. This situation is broken only when 
the degree of inefficiency of the distributive equilibrium is so great 
that the cost share of each group in its own program exceeds its 
benefits to that group (Weingast, 1979), or when the national costs of 
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distributive politics cause a political demand to alter the electoral 
institutions, such as a switch to proportional representation 
(Rogowski, 1984). Because these are rather loose constraints, 
legislatures located in the upper right-hand portion of Figure 2 will 
be relatively free to engage in highly inefficient distributive 
programs. 
By contrast, party-list legislators and separately elected chief 
executives must win a large national coalition. Consequently, because 
they must form a much larger coalition, they have less of an incentive 
to engage in distributive politics. The reason is that national 
elections, whether presidential elections or nationwide proportional 
representation, force candidates and parties to offer simultaneously an 
entire package of distributive programs which voters must accept or 
reject as an entirety. This places a far more stringent constraint on 
the degree of inefficiency of the package: the tax share of the 
party's coalition must be smaller for all programs together than each 
group's particular benefit from its own program. 
The resolution of the conflict between national political 
interests, represented by coalitions, parties and chief executives, and 
particularistic interests, as represented by autonomous legislators who 
represent narrow constituencies, is decided by the relative power of 
the two forces. Hence the rationale for the conclusion that the least 
degree of distributive politics is found in systems located at the 
origin of Figure 2. 
Protection of industry, whether through international trade 
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barriers or internal barriers to competition and free entry, is an 
example of distributive politics. It provides income and wealth to the 
favored economic interest, but reduces production efficiency. 
Consequently, the extent to which an industry-specific policy becomes 
protectionist should depend on the political structure of the country. 
The same telecommunications industry organization, for example, should 
produce distinctly different results in, say, the United States, France 
and the Netherlands. Moreover, if change does occur in the direction 
of less protectionism, its source is more likely to be in the executive 
branch and among party leaders than among legislators in any country in 
which constituencies are relatively small in legislative elections. 
For example, in the United States, both Democrat Jimmy Carter and 
Republican Ronald Reagan were instigators of economic deregulation, and 
in both cases moved substantially faster than Congress wanted or would 
have on its own (Derthick and Quirk, 1984). The engine of change was 
executive appointments to regulatory bureaus and executive court 
actions, like the AT&T antitrust case. 
The second institutional factor affecting policy is 
organizational: the forms of the organizations that connect policy 
makers to private industry. In part, this was discussed above in the 
analysis of the economic structure of the industry. The political 
system can exercise maximal control when political actors actually run 
an industry, as with ministerial public enterprise. This is an example 
of a more general phenomenon: the ability of the political process to 
direct economic activity in any area is greatest if the connection 
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between elected officials and the industry' s decision-makers is direct, 
and does not need to be mediated through another organization, such as 
a regulatory agency or some other bureau comprised of professional 
mediators, such as trade associations. Another example, besides 
ministerial public enterprise, is corporatism as practiced in some 
European countries and in some Japanese industries. Here government 
ministries possess the means to control or at least strongly to 
influence private decisions (such as in controlling credit or the 
allocation of research), and implement their plans through direct 
contact with officials of industry. This, of course, is a more 
attenuated form of control than a ministerial public enterprise. 
Corporatism is closer in form to an independent public enterprise that 
must have important elements of its budget approved by the political 
system (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority or the United States 
Postal Service). 
When intermediating organizations are present, the degree of 
political control over the target industry depends on the structural 
features of the intermediating agency. Several factors influence 
whether the intermediating agency effectively transmits government 
policy, acts relatively independently of either government or the 
private sector, or serves largely as a conduit for the interests of the 
target industry (Noll, 1983). 
(1) Is the authority of the agency narrowly defined in law, or 
does it have a broad instruction to develop policy in an ill-defined 
public interest? Vague mandates invite autonomous bureaus or capture 
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by the private sector. 
(2) Who runs the organization, and how are they appointed? Do 
they serve at the pleasure of political leaders (or private groups), or 
are they long-term, secure employees, such as career civil servants or 
judges? The latter invites independence, and the development of policy 
according to the professional norms of the type of people who populate 
the agency. 
(3) What procedures must the organization follow for reaching 
decisions? Does it bear a difficult burden of proof, or can it act 
relatively freely of evidentiary requirements? Are its processes open 
to participation by anyone, or are they closed to groups strongly 
affected by them, or perhaps even to everyone other than the target 
industry? Generally, a high evidentiary burden and a relatively open 
process favor autonomy; a high evidentiary burden and a closed process 
favor industry (because only industry can supply the evidence needed to 
support a decision); and a low evidentiary burden makes the process 
more unpredictable. 
(4) Does the intermediating agency possess rich or poor resources 
relative to the scope of its authority? Understaffed organizations are 
obviously going to be more dependent on outsiders for direction. 
(5) What is the nature of formal, external review of the role of 
the mediator? Is the organization advisory to political actors and/or 
industry? Is it decisive, but subject to extensive judicial review? 
Or is the only check on decisions the response of the political process 
to its performance? These alternatives are ordered according to 
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increasing autonomy, of course; the nature of the review will determine 
whether it tips in favor of political control or industry control. 
Industry, for example, is likely to benefit from extensive reviews-­
unless the opposition is well organized, such as is the case in matters 
of environmental policy. But in communications policy in a setting of 
monopolistic supply, opposition is not likely to be well organized, so 
that extensive external review opportunities will favor the 
monopolistic supplier. 
In summary, the organizational aspects of institutional analysis 
deal with the extent to which pluralist and other politically effective 
interests can attain their ends for reasons related to the structure of 
the relevant decision-making environment. Of course, political actors 
probably are in some sense aware of these distinctions; hence their 
choice of an institutional mechanism for implementing policy will also 
reflect the political forces giving rise to policy (Fiorina, 1984; 
McCubbins, forthcoming). To undertake a protectionist policy, but to 
implement it through an independent organization staffed by, say, 
economists practicing a norm of efficiency, is to attenuate vastly the 
protectionist bent of the process. Indeed, in the United States, 
precisely such a move was undertaken in the 1930s when economists in 
the United States Treasury were given a key role in determining tariffs 
(Goldstein, 1983). Thus, it would be a mistake to think of these 
organizational factors as completely independent in affecting policy. 
But for analytical purposes, categorizing them separately serves a 
useful function for understanding how the existing institutional 
structure is likely to push policy. 
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS 
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Suppose that the topic of interest to policy analysis is to 
examine institutional alternatives in terms of their contributions to 
national objectives as the latter emerge from democratic or statist 
theories, but in a setting in which pluralist forces are at work, 
though with varying degrees of impact owing to institutional factors. 
We can then offer some hypotheses about how communications policies 
might evolve and perform using the theoretical perspectives offered in 
the previous section. 
Communications is relatively important sector from both the 
democratic and statist perspective because individual users derive so 
much economic well-being from these activities; because 
telecommunications especially is so important to the development of 
other sectors of the economy; and because of the role of communications 
in serving noneconomic national objectives. Thus, from a pluralist 
perspective, the sector is more likely than others to be the focus of 
significant political attention from groups other than the suppliers of 
services. One would not expect a pure protectionist policy to be 
stable, given the importance of the sector. 
Nevertheless, the communications sector tends to be highly 
concentrated and well organized, so that it, too, should be a potent 
political force. Because history has brought us to a position of 
relatively high concentration, movements toward less centralized 
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control must overcome considerable political inertia. How fast this 
takes place depends on three things: the extent to which a less 
centralized regime actually serves interests other than those of the 
supply side; the institutional structure in which change is taking 
place; and whether telecounnunications can be tied into a currently 
salient general political issue. 
A discussion of the economic and technical merits of decentralized 
control is beyond the scope of this paper, except to cite the nature of 
the debate. The technical argument for centralized control is 
economies of scale and scope: costs allegedly will be lower and 
service is better if production is centralized. The opposing argument 
is that in most advanced countries the size and diversity of demand for 
communications services has long since passed the point at which it is 
most effectively provided through a centralized structure. More 
diversity of supply, it is argued, will cause services to be better 
tailored to specific user needs, and will enhance innovation so that 
any possible economies of centralization will be more than offset. 
Suppose that the argument for greater diversity is technically 
correct, so that on balance democratic, statist and other pluralist 
forces will favor it. Then the following ceteris paribus hypotheses 
should flow from some combination of the four theoretical models 
described here. 
(1) The speed of reform should be greater in n�tions with 
relatively advanced sectors that make extensive use of the 
telecommunications system, and that are relatively concentrated or 
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otherwise politically well organized. For example, nations with strong 
computer industries should move toward reform more rapidly than nations 
relying essentially completely on imported computers. 
(2) The speed of the reform should be more rapid in countries in 
which the performance of the industry is least efficient, thereby 
imposing the greatest cost to users. Of course, in the real world the 
ceteris paribus element is likely to be violated between this and the 
first hypothesis; countries with highly progressive computer and 
electronics industries usually have very advanced counnunications 
systems that encourage these developments. Nevertheless, the 
independent effects of an advanced user industry and an advanced 
supplier industry ought to be in the opposite direction. 
(3) The speed of reform should occur more rapidly in countries in 
which reorganization to improve the performance of the domestic economy 
is, in some form, a salient political issue. 
(4) Countries that are most vulnerable to their position in 
international trade should evolve more quickly in the direction of 
efficient reform, as should countries in which there is the strongest 
demand for national identity, whether expressed as social cohesion or a 
strong national defense. 
(5) Politicians with national constituencies ought to view reform 
more favorably than leaders with localized constituencies. Thus, in 
countries with independent executive and legislative branches, the 
executive branch ought to be more reformist; meanwhile, legislatures 
composed of representative from separate geographic constituencies 
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ought to be the most reluctant to change. 
(6) In countries with strong, independent legislators, reform 
should be more effective the greater is the distance of the 
legislature from the details of communications policy-making, 
attenuating particularistic control by pluralist forces. In all 
societies, creating an intermediating technical bureaucracy between the 
government and the telecommunications sector should produce a more 
efficient industry than would a structure in which political control is 
exercised through direct contacts between political leaders and 
industry decision-makers. 
More generally, the problem of developing effective national 
interventions by governments at the level of industries and companies 
is more severe in relatively self-sufficient, diverse societies, and in 
nations with political structures that tend to fragment decision-making 
among political leaders with separate constituencies. Effective 
regulation or industrial policy, therefore, ought to be more difficult 
in Britain or the United States than, say, in Japan, with West Germany 
and France in intermediate positions. ( But for the same reasons, other 
types of policies--infrastructure investments, for example--should 
flourish more in the former. ) 
These hypotheses provide some insight into why communications was 
ripe for reform circa 1980. A favorable political climate was created 
by disruptions in trade and by the deterioration in the economies of 
advanced industrialized states that began in the 1970s. This gave rise 
to structural reorganization of the institutions controlling the 
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economy as a salient political issue. At the same time, the 
microelectronics revolution substantially increased the demand for 
communications services, as well as the supply of new, more efficient 
equipment to provide them . Both factors undermine the political 
ability of supply organizations to maintain protectionist policies, 
whether private corporations or public monopolies. 
The first condition contributing to the reform environment is far 
more likely to disappear than the second. A restoration of economic 
stability and growth would cause the issue of national economic 
management to slip on the list of salient national political issues. 
But the relatively balanced conflict between users and suppliers in the 
communications sector will remain. This conflict should work towards 
efficient performance as long as the institutional structure makes use 
of the conflict to guide policy. The primary threat is that the 
competing interests will reach accommodation and present a united front 
through merger or a cartel-like agreement. Such a threat is most 
likely to emerge, again, in relatively self-sufficient, diverse 
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